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ABSTRACT 
Incentives to Grow: Multimarket Firms and Predation 
by Rainer Nitsche* 
Network industries with low sunk costs have been popular examples for the theory of 
contestable markets and spatial competition models. We argue that, due to the 
multimarket nature of operations, theories of predation are more relevant to explain 
strategic behaviour. Building on well established reputation models our contribution is 
threefold. First, we use a more realistic sequencing of the game and strengthen the entry 
deterrence result. Second, we show that rational multimarket firms may use (the threat 
of) predatory entry to expand. Third, we allow strategic interaction of two multimarket 
firms and find that multimarket firms do not "attack'' each other. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Expansionsanreize: Multimarktunternehmen und Verdrängungsstrategien 
Netzwerkindustrien mit geringen versunkenen Kosten dienten häufig als 
Anwendungsfelder für die Theorie der bestreitbaren Märkte und für Modelle des 
räumlichen Wettbewerbs. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird argumentiert, daß aufgrund 
der Multimarktnatur dieser Branchen Theorien des Verdrängungsverhaltens eine 
relevantere Erklärung des strategischen Verhaltens liefern. Auf der Basis der etablierten 
Reputationsmodelle werden drei Neuerungen entwickelt. Erstens wird eine 
Spielsequenz eingeführt, die nicht nur realistischer ist als die herkömmliche 
Modellierung, sondern auch zu einer plausibleren Prognose führt: Verhinderung von 
Markteintritt in sämtlichen Märkten. Zweitens wird gezeigt, daß rationale 
Multimarktunternehmen die Drohung eines Markteintritts mit anschließender 
Verdrängung des alteingesessenen „Mittelständlers“ (Einmarktunternehmens) im 
Rahmen einer Expansionsstrategie glaubhaft nutzen können. Schließlich wird, drittens, 
die strategische Interaktion von zwei Multimarktunternehmen untersucht. Es zeigt sich, 
daß sie auf gegenseitigen „Angriff“ verzichten und nicht in einen Markt des jeweils 
anderen Multimarkt-Wettbewerbers eindringen. 
 
                                                 
*  The author expresses his gratitude to Paul Heidhues, Jos Jansen, Johan Lagerlöf, and Lars-Hendrik 
Röller for their helpful comments and criticisms. 
1 Introduction
Stories about markets can have an important impact on economic policy. In
1984 the British Government proclaimed in its White Paper on buses that
the bus market was highly contestable (Department of Transport 1984).
Two years later the local bus market outside London was completely deregu-
lated. Critiques of deregulation used the framework of a circular city when
analysing local bus markets (e.g. Evans 1987). They argued that deregula-
tion would lower welfare due to excessive entry. Similar arguments for and
against liberalisation have been put forward for other network industries like
airlines or postal services. These industries share one characteristic which
has dominated applied economic analysis and strongly inßuenced policy ad-
vice: sunk costs are low. That is, building up or closing down operations in
these markets is cheap compared to other network industries. This motivated
the assumption that entry and exit are (almost) costless which is required
for contestability as well as the circular city framework. In fact the analysis
of the existence of sunk costs has become the key criterion for motivating
deregulation and liberalisation.
We believe that a richer and more careful comparison of stylised facts
with the assumptions and predictions of these models reveals that their ex-
planatory value for the particular network industries is limited. Take again
the British bus industry. We claim that apart from low sunk costs the fol-
lowing stylised facts have empirical substance:1 (1) Competition is localised.
A bus service may compete to some extent with a service that operates in
the same corridor. Certainly, it does not compete with a service in another
area. (2) Fares, frequencies, and scheduling of services can be varied with-
out signiÞcant time lags. (3) Economies of scale and scope cannot explain
competitive advantages of large Þrms. In its plentiful investigations into the
bus industry, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission could not Þnd any
systematic unit cost advantage for large operators. (4) Industry concentra-
tion has increased signiÞcantly since deregulation. In the period from 1989
to 1999 the four Þrm concentration ratio (turnover) went up from 12% to
59%.2 (5) Competition on the road was a rare event and where it occurred
the Þrms involved typically did not cover their costs, since incumbents did
not relocate or reschedule their services. (6) Large Þrms almost never entered
markets of other large Þrms.
1The stylised facts can be derived from the reports of the competition authorities (e.g.
MMC 1995) and research reports which were commissioned by the British Government
(e.g. Balcombe et al. 1992).
2Market share (turnover) of the four largest bus operators (holdings) in Great Britain
(see Monopolies and Mergers Commission 1995 and TAS 2000). Local concentration is
much higher since, Þrst, these Þrms do not operate in all local markets and, second, they
do not operate in the same set of markets.
1
These facts cause problems for the prevailing models of the industry. The
fact (2) that fares and service levels can be varied without signiÞcant lags
does not Þt the theory of contestable markets. According to this theory,
monopolists behave as if they are facing active competition since they fear
that otherwise a potential entrant will enter, price its service slightly below
the prevailing level of the incumbent, earn proÞts until the incumbent reacts
and then exit the market (Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1982). It is well
established that even with almost no sunk costs the threat of hit and run
entry is not credible if incumbents can react to entry with (almost) no lag,
which is what we observe in the industry (Reynolds and Schwartz 1983,
Shepherd 1984).
The results of the circular city model are driven by the following argu-
ments. In deregulated markets entry and competition would cause incum-
bents to reschedule their services (to make room for the entrant) until proÞts
in the industry are zero and no further entry occurs. Given that entrants
do not take into account the business stealing eﬀect that their entry has on
rivals, too many buses will chase too few passengers. Hence, although prices
reßect costs, welfare is worse than in a perfectly regulated benchmark since
too many buses imply too high Þxed costs (Salop 1979, Evans 1987). Facts
(4) and (5) contradict the assumptions of this model. Entry was not often
observed and when it was observed the incumbent typically did not resched-
ule (often the frequency of services was increased) and both Þrms lost money
until one of the rivals left the market or was taken-over by the other.
We believe that neither approach performs well in explaining the eco-
nomics of the market, which captures the essence of market evolution. Rather,
we suggest a predation model, claim that it has more explanatory value and
try to give some formal underpinning.3 Emphasising stylised fact (1) that
competition is localised we attempt to show how multimarket Þrms may ben-
eÞt from operating in several distinct markets. This explains why we observe
increasing concentration (4) although this cannot be explained by economies
of scale and scope (3) or barriers to entry due to sunk costs.
The basic intuition of our arguments is well established. Milgrom and
3Although to our knowledge no formal explanation of predation in the bus industry
exist, there is previous work that has highlighted the potential importance of predation.
First, in its various competition cases both British competition authorities, MMC and
OFT, found evidence of predation in the bus industry. Second, Dodgson et al. (1988)
pointed to the importance of the theory of predation for the bus industry and later (1992)
developed a model to detect the incidence of predation in the bus industry. Third, some
authors were aware of the importance of predation as a factor of market evolution in the
bus industry. However, before deregulation most trusted that the competition authorities
would be prepared to prevent such action (Foster and Golay, 1986). Given the striking
number of competition cases in the bus industry it is amazing that the arguments for the
motivation of predation in this industry have remained cursory.
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Roberts (1982, hereafter MR) and Kreps and Wilson (1982, hereafter KW)
showed how reputation eﬀects can deter entry of small Þrms into distinct
markets of a chain-store. Benoit (1983), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and
others showed how large Þrms may use their Þnancial clout to deter entry
of small Þrms. These results were important since they provided formal un-
derpinning to previous arguments that predation may be a rational strategy
although it is costly in the short run.
Following work on reputation eﬀects concentrated on varying the assump-
tions with regard to the informational structure and tested the robustness
of results and investigated reputation eﬀects in various settings.4 The more
recent literature on the long-purse eﬀect focussed on investigating the na-
ture of the capital market imperfections that explain why some Þrms may be
Þnancially more constrained than others.5
Three reasons prevent us from simply applying these models to industries
with localised competition. First, we Þnd that the existing reputation mod-
els have two fundamental problems. They predict that singlemarket (sm)
Þrms will enter one or more markets of the multimarket (mm) Þrm that are
played late in the game. This prediction seems diﬃcult to reconcile with
a geographical interpretation of markets like in the chain-store game or in
transport markets where the sequence of markets is not obvious and hence
should not drive results. Moreover, and related, traditional reputation mod-
els force some entrant to be the Þrst to make its entry decision without being
able to reconsider it later. This assumption seems strong since in reality
sm-Þrms may prefer to wait in order to observe others testing the type of
the mm-Þrm. In our model sm-Þrms are able to reconsider their decision to
stay out when they learn more about the type of the mm-Þrm. As a result
we obtain a free-rider eﬀect and more plausible predictions that strengthen
the result of MR an KW.
Second, existing reputation and long purse models have shown why a
monopolistic market structure may persist. However, we would like to learn
more about market evolution, asking whether reputation and long purse ef-
fects can explain rational predatory entry of mm-Þrms in markets of sm-Þrms.
In order to analyse this question we develop a reputation model with two
source games and re-interpret the long purse model. We Þnd that large
mm-Þrms have an incentive for predatory entry and are able to specify what
4Fudenberg and Levine (1989) were able to derive the same basic intuition in a more
general setting. They did not restrict the number of types, showed that a normal player
would choose to imitate the most favourable type and showed that in any Nash equilibrium,
provided that there are enough periods and the discount factor approaches one, the payoﬀ
of the normal chain-store cannot be much below the payoﬀ of the mimicked store.
Following work continued to investigate lower bounds in more general classes of repeated
games (Schmidt 1993, Cripps and Thomas 1995, Celentani et al. 1996).
5This has been the focus of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) as well as Hendel (1996).
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large means in the context of both models.
Third, although there are a number of reputation models that investigate
strategic interaction of two long-lived players, there is no analysis of two
multimarket Þrms operating in diﬀerent markets and considering entering a
market of a mm-rival.6 We analyse strategic interaction of two multimarket
Þrms and show that large Þrms collude in the sense that they avoid attacking
each other.
Based on the results of our analysis we claim that predation theories pro-
vide a more consistent explanation of market evolution and Þt the stylised
facts much better than circular city models or the contestable markets ap-
proach used before. This leads to an important policy implication. When
liberalising (network) industries with localised competition an eﬀective en-
forcement of anti-predation rules is warranted. Unless this is ensured, there
is an incentive to grow in order to reap the beneÞts of controlling many mar-
kets: behavioural barriers to entry, the opportunity for (a credible threat of)
predatory entry, and, Þnally, collusion with other mm-Þrms. The limited suc-
cess of competition authorities to prevent a process of concentration in some
of these markets suggests that there is room for improvement in competition
policy.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic reputation
model. This model is used in section 3 in order to analyse equilibrium en-
try decisions in diﬀerent entry constellations (singlemarket Þrms challenge a
multimarket Þrm, a multimarket Þrm challenges a singlemarket Þrm, a mul-
timarket Þrm challenges another multimarket Þrm). Section 4 introduces a
diﬀerent setup in order to analyse the impact of imperfect capital markets
on the entry behaviour of multimarket Þrms. In section 5 we compare our
results with the stylised facts sketched above. The conclusions are presented
in section 6.
2 The reputation model
In this section we develop a reputation game which is based on the games
introduced by MR and KW. Their work was inspired by Seltens analysis of
a complete and perfect information game in which a chain-store was unable
to deter entry, although intuition suggested that it should be able to do so
(Selten 1978). Following Seltens suggestion to look for amendments to the
strict backwards induction argument in order to resolve the paradox, MR
and KW developed the notion of reputation. They showed that if there
is some element of uncertainty regarding the type or the behaviour of the
6Schmidt (1993), Cripps and Thomas (1995) and Celentani et al. (1996) investigate
strategic interaction of two long-run players.
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incumbent, he may have an incentive to invest in gaining or maintaining a
reputation for being tough in order to deter entry in other markets. As a
result, if there is a minimum number of other markets (potential entrants),
the incumbents strategy may include Þghting in some markets although in
the short run this implies losses.
2.1 The game with complete information
We consider a game with a multimarket (mm) Þrm b that is the incumbent
operator inM identical markets and co-ordinates decisions of its subsidiaries
in these markets. Each of these markets is subject to potential entry by a
singlemarket (sm) Þrm. The entry games are played sequentially and each
player can observe the actions of Þrms in those market games that have
been played before. Markets are indexed backwards, i.e. the entry game
in market M is played Þrst. We denote the set of (identical) sm-Þrms by
S = {a1, ..., aM}, where sm-Þrms aM , ..., a1 are the potential entrants, each
for a diﬀerent market.
Market games,
 m œ {1, ..., M}
0
Πb
Ψa
Ψb
−Φa
−Φb
FmAm
Om Im
sm
mm
( )
( )
( )
sm
mm
Figure 1: Market games (normal types)
The entry game has two stages (see Figure 1). In the Þrst stage the
sm-Þrm either enters market m ∈ {1, ...,M}, denoted Im, or stays out, Om.
In the latter case the market game ends, the sm-entrant gets a payoﬀ of
zero and the mm-incumbent earns monopoly proÞts, Πb > 0. If the sm-Þrm
enters, it is the mm-Þrms turn to either Þght, Fm, or to acquiesce Am. In
case the mm-Þrm Þghts, both lose money, −Φi < 0 (for i = a, b). If the
mm-Þrm acquiesces, both earn strictly positive proÞts, Ψi (for i = a, b). For
each Þrm the payoﬀ of acquiescing is lower than monopoly proÞts. Taken
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together these assumptions imply
−Φi < 0 < Ψi < Πi for i = a, b.
The payoﬀs in the market games are designed in a way which suggests
that if the market game is played with complete and perfect information,
the sm-entrant will never choose Om since the mm-Þrm will always acquiesce
rather than Þght in the last subgame. By backward induction, this result
does not change if the market game is repeated Þnitely often, the so-called
chain-store paradox.
2.2 The game with incomplete information
In one way or another all approaches, which intend to solve the paradox, in-
troduce uncertainty in order to overcome the problem of backward induction
leading to implausible equilibrium outcomes in complete and perfect infor-
mation games with a Þnite horizon. We follow KW and assume that with
a small initial probability the mm-Þrm is tough rather than normal. We
denote the type θb =
n
θtoughb , θ
normal
b
o
and the (perceived) initial probability
that the mm-Þrm is tough β, i.e. prob
³
θb = θ
tough
b
´
= β. These priors are
common knowledge. At the beginning of a market game m the players belief
that the mm-Þrm is tough is denoted by pm. In order to simplify the analysis
we deviate from KW by assuming that tough Þrms have a reduced action
space compared to the normal types.7 Tough mm-Þrms can only respond to
Im by choosing Fm. We will solve for perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE).
In the following we want to concentrate on cases where reputation eﬀects
may matter. In order to do so we need to eliminate two trivial cases.
2.3 Requirements for reputation to evolve
If the prior probability that the mm-Þrm is tough, β, is suﬃciently high, an
sm-Þrm will choose Om even if markets are considered in isolation. In order
to make the game interesting we think of the probability β as being low.
That is we assume 0 < β(−Φa) + (1− β)Ψa or
β <
Ψa
Ψa + Φa
≡ β (1)
such that an sm-Þrm chooses Im if only one market game is played.
Even if markets are informationally linked, Þrms may not want to invest
in reputation. A necessary condition for mm-Þrms strictly preferring to Þght
7In this respect we follow MR. KW do not restrict the action space but focus on
reasonable equilibria - yielding the same outcome.
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is that the proÞts of a successful entry deterrence are higher than the proÞts
of acquiescing:
−Φb +Πb > 2Ψb (2)
We will restrict our analysis to cases where equation (2) is satisÞed so that
reputation eﬀects can arise if there are at least two markets that are infor-
mationally linked.
2.4 Standard results
In standard reputation models in the tradition of the chain-store paradox
market games are played sequentially and sm-Þrms that have chosen to stay
out cannot reconsider their decision even if they observe the mm-Þrm acqui-
escing in later markets. In this setup the following beliefs and strategies form
a PBE.
The beliefs of sm-Þrms about the type of the mm-Þrm are updated on
observed actions using Bayes rule where possible. In the Þrst period set
pM = β. In all following periods:
pm =

pm+1 if Om+1
0 if Im+1 and Am+1, or
if Im+1 and Fm+1 and pm+1 = 0
max(β
m
, pm+1) if Im+1 and Fm+1 and pm+1 6= 0
That is up to the Þrst entry sm-Þrms cannot update their beliefs and they
make use of the prior probability that the mm-Þrm is tough. If the mm-Þrm
is observed acquiescing on entry, the sm-Þrms in following markets will set
pm = 0 since tough mm-Þrms cannot choose to acquiesce. If the mm-Þrm
has acquiesced once, sm-Þrms will continue to believe that the mm-Þrm is
normal (pm = 0), even if they observe the mm-Þrm Þghting in a market after
it has acquiesced. This is because they know that the mm-Þrm is normal
when it has acquiesced once. If the mm-Þrm has not yet acquiesced before
and Þghts on entry of an sm-Þrm, the sm-Þrms will revise their belief that
the mm-Þrm is tough upwards if β
m
> pm+1. Note that the critical value β
m
increases the fewer markets m are left to play.
The strategy of sm-Þrms is:
Om if pm > β
m
Im with probability γ = Πb−2Ψb−ΦbΠb−Ψb and
Om with the complementary probability if pm = β
m
Im if pm < β
m
7
The sm-Þrms equilibrium actions depend on the relation β
m
to pm. If
pm > β
m
they will stay out, if pm < β
m
they enter. If pm = β
m
they
randomise. The entry probability γ is such that mm-Þrms may randomise
between Þghting and acquiescing in the preceding market.
The strategy of a (normal) mm-Þrm is:
Fm if m ≥ 2 and pm ≥ βm−1
Fm with probability σm =
pm
(1−pm)
³
1−βm−1
β
m−1
´
and
Am with the complementary probability if m ≥ 2 and pm < βm−1
A1 if m = 1
Note that a tough mm-Þrm can only Þght. A normal mm-Þrm will imitate
a tough mm-Þrm as long as pm ≥ βm−1. Once pm is below that critical level
it will randomise between Þghting and acquiescing. The Þghting probability
σm
8 is such that the sm-Þrm in m may randomise its entry decision. Note
that σm = 0 if pm = 0. In the last market the normal mm-Þrm acquiesces
since there are no gains from imitating the tough mm-Þrm.
Proposition 1 (KW9) If β 6= βm for any m ≤ M , then the beliefs and
strategies given above constitute the unique PBE.
If β = β
m
for any m ≤ M , the PBE is not unique since the sm-Þrm
am can choose Im with any probability. This does not aﬀect equilibrium
strategies of the other Þrms.
Figure 2 shows an example of how the game can be played in equilibrium.
In marketsM to em the mm-Þrm Þghts with probability one and the sm-Þrms
stay out. In the following market, em−1, we have pm < βm. Thus the sm-Þrm
enters and the mm-Þrm randomises between Þghting and acquiescing. In our
example the mm-Þrm Þghts. The sm-Þrm in market em − 2 updates its be-
liefs and randomises on entry, the mm-Þrm randomises between Þghting and
acquiescing. In the example the sm-Þrm enters and the mm-Þrm acquiesces.
From then until the end of the game equilibrium play in each market m will
be Im and Am.
8Note that 0 < σm < 1. This follows from pm < β
m−1
.
9KW use the concept of sequential equilibrium. Since the game has only two types PBE
gives the same results (see Fudenberg and Tirole 1990). KW do not restrict action spaces of
tough types. After eliminating unreasonable out-of-equilibrium beliefs they obtain unique
on-the-equilibrium-path strategies in the parameter space β 6= βm. Our stronger result
stems from the fact that if the mm-Þrm acquiesced once, the sm-Þrms cannot - even oﬀ
the equilibrium path - revise their belief that the mm-Þrm is normal.
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M M-1 1
* * * * * * *
*
* *
1, 1
I, A I, A
1, 1g, s
I, F I, A
1, s1
O O
11
O O
11
O O
1
Market
p
m
Action
Prob.
bm
m~
-
Figure 2: An example for actual play in equilibrium
2.5 A new timing of the game
In this section we amend the timing of the standard reputation model for
two reasons. The prediction of traditional reputation games that one or
more late markets will be challenged by an entrant whereas in early
markets entry is deterred seems diﬃcult to interpret in the context of a
geographical interpretation of markets like in the chain-store game or in
transport industries. The outcome of a market game should (at least in
equilibrium) not depend on where it is positioned in the sequence.10
Moreover, traditional reputation models make the strong assumption that
an sm-Þrm can be forced to be the Þrst to make its entry decision without
being able to reconsider it. We believe that a multimarket reputation model
should capture the following intuition. If nobody forces an sm-Þrm to enter
as the Þrst sm-Þrm, it may well be that nobody wants to test the water and
all stay out. We suggest a diﬀerent timing of the model that takes this free
rider eﬀect into account and yields more plausible predictions.
The main innovation is that sm-Þrms may reconsider their entry decision
when they observe that the mm-Þrm acquiesced: Suppose all M markets are
played once according to the sequence and rules deÞned above. After this
10A related point has been made by Masso who argued that it is a shortcoming of
the traditional reputation games to assume that ...agents can distinguish between those
Þrms that have not yet decided whether to enter the market or not and those that have
already decided not to enter (Masso 1996, p. 58). Contrary to our approach he assumes
uncertainty about the ordering and imperfect information on the history of the game. In
the original chain store game (second version) Selten avoided this problem by assuming
that before a market game is played all potential entrants decide whether to enter or not.
Then a random mechanism selects one player that is allowed to enter (Selten 1978, p.
134).
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Þrst round, one out of three situations may prevail. Either the set of sm-Þrms
that chose O during the Þrst round is empty so that all sm-Þrms entered or all
have decided to stay out. In these two cases the game ends after all markets
have been played once. If, however, some but not all sm-Þrms have decided
to stay out, these Þrms can play again in a second round.
More generally, let Sr ⊆ S be the set of sm-Þrms that chose O in all
rounds preceding round r and let Sr+1 ⊆ Sr be the set of sm-Þrms that chose
O in round r and all preceding rounds. In other words Sr denotes the set of
potential entrants in round r. The game is played over a sequence of rounds
r = 1, ..., R, where R is determined by the players strategies. If after round
r we have Sr+1 6= Sr and Sr+1 6= φ, sm-Þrms Sr+1 play another round, r+ 1.
In the Þrst round r, after which Sr+1 = Sr or Sr+1 = φ, the game ends and
we denote that round by R. In any round r ≤ R we will call the market with
the lowest index the last market so that if in this round all sm-Þrms with a
higher index choose O, the last sm-entrant decides whether the game will be
continued or not.11 Let m denote the number of sm-Þrms that have not yet
entered at any given history. Note that at the beginning of each round we
havem = |Sr|. Moreover, it is convenient to denote the belief of the sm-Þrms
that the mm-Þrm is tough at any period in which m sm-Þrms have not yet
entered by pm.12
3 Equilibrium entry decisions
We begin our analysis by identifying the general conditions under which sm-
Þrms other than the last in a round will prefer to choose O in order to wait
and see. In a next step we show that these conditions almost always hold
in the context of our multimarket game.
3.1 The externality eﬀect
In equilibrium it will be the last Þrm in a round that decides whether a game
is continued (if it chooses I) or whether it ends (if it chooses O). Two lemmas
lead to this result.
Lemma 1 If in any round br the mm-Þrm acquiesces or if in that round pm =
0, then all Þrms in Sbr enter with probability one before the game terminates
and the mm-Þrm responds with acquiescence to every entry.
11In case the game was played as a complete information game with only normal types,
we would obtain the chain store paradox: all sm-Þrms would choose to enter and the
mm-Þrm would acquiesce in every market.
12Note that sm-Þrms always share the same belief about the type of the mm-Þrm. This
is required by our solution concept, PBE.
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Proof. To prove the lemma it suﬃces to show that in every round r ≥ br at
least one sm-Þrm in Sr will choose I until Sr = φ. Note that ifm = 1 and the
sm-Þrm in Sr chooses I, a normal mm-Þrm acquiesces, independent of the
history of play up to this round. This follows immediately from the payoﬀ
structure (Ψb > −Φb) and the fact that the game ends after this move of the
mm-Þrm. Now suppose m = 2 and the Þrms in Sr know that the mm-Þrm is
normal since it has acquiesced in a previous round, pm = 0.13 Suppose the
Þrst Þrm has chosen O and consider the decision problem of the last sm-Þrm.
Since in the next and Þnal round the sm-Þrm which chose O in the current
round will choose I, independent of the mm-Þrms play in the current round,
the mm-Þrm will acquiesce with probability one (2Ψb > −Φb + Ψb). Hence
the last Þrm in Sr with m = 2 will choose I. Thus at least one Þrm enters
when m = 2. By backward induction this applies to all rounds that follow a
round r in which the mm-Þrm acquiesced such that in these rounds we have
pm = 0.
This result is not surprising since after the occurrence of acquiescence
uncertainty vanishes and we Þnd the full information result of the original
chain-store game of Selten (1978).
Lemma 2 Suppose the sm-Þrms in round r believe that the response to the
Þrst entry in this round will be a Þght with probability f > 0 and, in case the
last sm-Þrm is indiﬀerent, it chooses I with positive probability. Then any
sm-Þrm in Sr that is not the last sm-Þrm in round r will always choose O.
Proof. Consider a game in round r in which m ≥ 2 and pm > 0.14 Let f be
the probability with which the sm-Þrms believe that the mm-Þrm will Þght.
If 0 > f(−Φa) + (1− f)Ψa ⇔ f > β an sm-Þrm will choose O since the
probability f that the mm-Þrm will respond to I with a Þght is large in the
sense that I would yield the sm-Þrm an expected value smaller than zero.
If f < β and all sm-Þrms except the last choose O (no updating) the last
Þrm will choose I with probability one, since the expected payoﬀ of entering
is greater than zero. Choosing O is optimal for all sm-Þrms in Sr except the
last since the expected payoﬀ of choosing I in round r, f (−Φa)+(1− f)Ψa,
is smaller than the expected payoﬀ of choosing O, which is bounded from
below by (1− f)Ψa. This lower bound on the expected payoﬀ of choosing
O follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that the last sm-Þrm will enter with
13Note that pm = 0 after any incidence of acquiescence, even if the mm-Þrm - out of
equilibrium - chooses to Þght in one or more later periods. Given that we restricted the
action space of the tough mm-Þrm to Þghting, the sm-Þrms must believe that the mm-Þrm
is normal once they have observed it acquiescing once.
14Due to symmetry of the sm-Þrms, common knowledge of priors and full observability
of the history of moves, all sm-Þrms share the same beliefs about the type of the mm-Þrm
in any given period.
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probability one. By entering, the last Þrm bears the risk of being fought in
this round. Since each of the other sm-Þrms can choose to enter in the next
round if and only if there was no Þght in this round, and with probability
(1− f) there is no Þght in this round, their proÞts are bounded from below
by (1− f)Ψa by Lemma 1.
Thus, for f 6= β and a positive probability of a Þght (f > 0) all sm-Þrms
in Sr except the last will choose O in equilibrium.
If f = β an sm-Þrm is indiﬀerent between I and O unless choosing O
leads to a continuation game with an expected value greater than zero. In
this case we require the assumption that the last Þrm will choose I with
positive probability in case it is indiﬀerent. Suppose the sm-Þrm with the
highest index in round r chooses O. In this case the sm-Þrm in the following
market cannot update beliefs about the mm-Þrm so that the probability of
a Þght is still f . Suppose this and all the following sm-Þrms except the last
choose O. Then the last sm-Þrm will be indiﬀerent between I and O. Let it
choose I with positive probability γ. Then with probability γ(1 − f) both
the sm-Þrms observe that the mm-Þrm acquiesces in the last market. In this
case, by Lemma 1, all remaining sm-Þrms in Sr choose I and the mm-Þrm
acquiesces. Thus the sm-Þrms expected payoﬀ of choosing O is at least
γ(1 − f)Ψa > 0. Thus all sm-Þrms with a higher index in Sr have moved
optimally by choosing O.
3.2 Singlemarket Þrms challenge a multimarket Þrm
In this section we analyse equilibrium strategies and beliefs, given the new
timing of the game. In order to characterise results we make use of the fol-
lowing terminology: We say that a normal mm-Þrm has a deterring Þghting
incentive in market m when the sm-Þrm chooses Om with probability one,
because it fears that the mm-Þrm will Þght with high enough probability.
The normal mm-Þrm is said to have a strong Þghting incentive if it strictly
prefers Þghting. Note that every strong Þghting incentive is also deterring
but not vice versa.
Proposition 2 If β > β
M
, the sm-entry game has a unique PBE outcome15
in which a normal mm-Þrm has a deterring Þghting incentive in market M.
Given this incentive, all sm-Þrms will be deterred.
Proposition 2 strengthens the result of the usual reputation models of
the chain-store game. It implies that no sm-Þrm enters in equilibrium if the
15Note that the behaviour on the equilibrium path is unique too. However, the equilib-
rium behaviour is supported by non unique behaviour oﬀ the equilibrium path (lemma 1
does not state in which round sm-Þrms enter).
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mm-Þrm has a deterring Þghting incentive, whereas in the models of KW and
MR sm-Þrms enter with positive probability when they are playing late in
the game. Despite this diﬀerence in equilibrium outcome, we obtain almost
the same equilibrium strategies and beliefs. Before proving Proposition 2 we
discuss those in more general terms.
We Þrst focus on the response of a normal mm-Þrm to the Þrst entry in a
given round and show that the probability of Þghting does not depend on the
position of a Þrm within a given round. This implies that the Þrst condition
of Lemma 2 holds in equilibrium.
If in any round r we havem = 1, the normal mm-Þrm will acquiesce since
it cannot gain from building a reputation. The sm-Þrms decision depends
on its belief that the mm-Þrm is tough, given previous play: if p1 < β it will
choose I1, if p1 > β it will choose O1, and if p1 = β the sm-Þrm is indiﬀerent
between I1 and O1.
Consider a game in round r in whichm = 2 and the belief of the sm-Þrms
in Sr that the mm-Þrm is tough is p2 < β. The Þrst entry may occur either
in the Þrst or in the last market of this round. Fix any of the two markets as
the one where the Þrst entry occurs and label it market 2 (and label the
other market 1).
In equilibrium the normal mm-Þrm in market 2 will neither Þght nor
acquiesce with probability one. If it fought with probability one, the sm-Þrm
in market 1 could not update its belief and would enter. Then Þghting in
market 2 cannot be optimal since it has no deterrence eﬀect. If the strategy
of the normal mm-Þrm was to acquiesce with probability one, the sm-Þrm in
market 1 would infer from a Þght in market 2 that the mm-Þrm is tough and
would choose O1. Then A2 cannot be optimal. In equilibrium the mm-Þrm
Þghts with probability σ2 =
p2
1−p2
³
1−β
β
´
so that if it does Þght p1 = β by
Bayes rule16. Then, if a Þght occurs in market 2, the sm-Þrm in market 1
is indiﬀerent and randomises on entry such that the mm-Þrm is indiﬀerent
between Þghting or acquiescing in market 2. Thus Þghting with probability
σ2 is the unique equilibrium strategy of the mm-Þrm in this situation.
Now consider a game in round r in which m = 3 and the belief of the
sm-Þrms in Sr that the mm-Þrm is tough is p3 > β
2
. Again Þx any of the
three markets as the one where the Þrst entry occurs and label it market 3
(and label the others arbitrarily 1 and 2, where 2 is the market that
is played next). If the mm-Þrm Þghts with probability one in market 3 there
will be no updating. However, since p2 > β
2
is suﬃcient to deter entry in
the following market, Þghting in market 3 is now the optimal strategy.
16By Bayes rule we have p1 =
1∗p2
p2+σ2(1−p2) . Setting p1 equal to the critical level β and
solving for σ2 yields σ2 =
p2
1−p2
³
1−β
β
´
.
13
If p3 ≤ β2 the normal mm-Þrm will neither Þght nor acquiesce with
probability by the same reasoning as in round r in which m = 2. Rather
Þghting with probability σ3 =
p3
1−p3
³
1−β2
β
2
´
is the unique equilibrium strategy.
The normal mm-Þrm can now plan to Þght with a higher probability than
in 2 (i.e. σ3 > σ2) since p2 required to make the sm-Þrm in 2 indiﬀerent is
β
2
< β.
Working backwards this way we obtain the equilibrium response to entry
of a normal mm-Þrm (tough mm-Þrms can only Þght):
Fm if m ≥ 2 and pm ≥ βm−1
Fm with probability σm =
pm
(1−pm)
³
1−βm−1
β
m−1
´
and
Am with the complementary probability if m ≥ 2 and pm < βm−1
A1 if m = 1.
(3)
Note that the strategy of the mm-Þrm depends only on the post-entry
number of potential future entrants m and the current belief that the mm-
Þrm is tough, pm. Thus the strategy is independent of the address of the
sm-Þrm that chooses to enter Þrst in a given round.
While analysing the strategy of the normal mm-Þrm we have taken the
belief of the sm-Þrms in the Þrst market where entry occurs as given by pm.
This belief must, of course, evolve from the beginning of the game. However,
since sm-Þrms cannot update their belief if no entry occurs, the belief ps
in any period s is fully deÞned by the belief pm in any period in which m
Þrms that have not yet entered. In the Þrst period set pm = pM = β. In all
following periods the beliefs are:
pm =

0 if Im+1 and Am+1, or
if Im+1 and Fm+1 and pm+1 = 0
max(β
m
, pm+1) if Im+1 and Fm+1 and pm+1 6= 0.
(4)
If the mm-Þrm has not yet acquiesced in any market and it is observed
Þghting, the sm-Þrms revise their belief that the mm-Þrm is tough upwards
if β
m
> pm+1. The beliefs are Bayesian consistent with the strategy of the
normal mm-Þrm except for Fm+1 if pm+1 = 0 and for Am+1 if pm+1 ≥ βm. In
both cases we set pm = 0 since sm-Þrms know that the mm-Þrm is normal
when it has acquiesced once. Thus they will continue to believe that the
mm-Þrm is normal (pm = 0), even if they observe the mm-Þrm Þghting in a
market after it has acquiesced.
Given the strategy of the mm-Þrm and the beliefs we can now turn to
the strategy of the sm-Þrms. By Lemma 2 any sm-Þrm in Sr that is not the
last sm-Þrm in round r will always choose O. The Lemma requires, Þrst,
that the last Þrm enters with positive probability if all other Þrms choose to
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stay out and, second, that the probability, f , with which the sm-Þrms in a
given round believe that the mm-Þrm will Þght is equal across all sm-Þrms
and does not change until the response to the Þrst entry can be observed.
The latter condition is satisÞed if δ, the probability that a normal mm-
Þrm Þghts, does not depend on the position of a sm-Þrm in a given round.
It suﬃces to analyse δ since f = pm + (1− pm) δ and pm is equal across all
sm-Þrms and cannot be updated until the Þrst entry occurs. However, we
have already shown that the Þghting probability δ does not depend on the
position of the market where the Þrst entry occurs in a given round.
Note that it is important for this result that the belief pm is a suﬃcient
statistic for the history of the game up to any period. Since updating is not
possible if sm-Þrms choose to stay out pm is equal across all sm-Þrms up to
the Þrst entry. Moreover, since we allow sm-Þrms that have decided to stay
out in a given round to play again if entry occurs in that round the post-entry
continuation game (the number of markets in which entry can potentially be
deterred) is independent from where in a given round entry occurs. Thus in
each round, δ is equal across markets until the Þrst entry occurs and the Þrst
condition of Lemma 2 is satisÞed.
The Þrst condition requires that the last sm-Þrm enters with positive
probability if all other sm-Þrms choose to stay out. Suppose in a given
round all sm-Þrms other than the last choose to stay out. Any last sm-
Þrm in a given round behaves completely myopic and the optimal entry
behaviour follows directly from the equilibrium strategy of the mm-Þrm and
the associated beliefs. With f = pm + (1− pm) δ and σm = pm(1−pm)
³
1−βm−1
β
m−1
´
by the strategy of the normal mm-Þrm we have f S β ⇔ pm S βm. Thus if
pm > β
m
we have f > β and by equation (1) the expected payoﬀ of entering,
f(−Φa) + (1 − f)Ψa, is smaller than zero and the sm-Þrm chooses Om. If
pm < β
m
we have f < β the expected payoﬀ is strictly positive and it chooses
Im. In case pm = β
m
the sm-Þrm is indiﬀerent between Im and Om (f = β).
In this case the sm-Þrm will randomise and choose Im with probability γm,
which supports the randomising strategy of the mm-Þrm in market m + 1
by equalising the returns of Þghting and acquiescing in m+1. The expected
payoﬀ to Þghting now is −Φb + (1− γm)mΠb + γmmΨb, i.e. γm is chosen so
that
−Φb + (1− γm)mΠb + γmmΨb = (m+ 1)Ψb
yielding γm =
mΠb−(m+1)Ψb−Φb
m(Πb−Ψb) .
17 Thus in any round we have the following
strategy for the last sm-Þrm provided that all other sm-Þrms have chosen to
17It follows from assumption (2) that 0 < γm < 1. Note that γm diﬀers from the entry
probability in the standard reputation games, γ = 2Ψb−Πb+ΦbΨb−Πb , since given the new timing
Om leads to monopoly proÞts in all m markets.
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stay out:
Om if pm > β
m
Im with probability γ =
mΠb−(m+1)Ψb−Φb
m(Πb−Ψb) and
Om with the complementary probability if pm = β
m
Im if pm < β
m
.
(5)
If pM 6= βM , last sm-Þrms that randomise enter with probability γm > 0
which satisÞes the second condition and Lemma 2 applies. In this case all
sm-Þrms but the last will indeed stay out. Only in the knife edge case where
pM = β
M
the last sm-Þrm in the Þrst round is indiﬀerent and it may enter
with any probability, including zero. As a result any sm-Þrm moving earlier
may or may not enter (i.e. Lemma 2 does not apply). In this case we do not
obtain uniqueness as in the traditional model by KW.
In equilibrium the expected payoﬀ of a normal mm-Þrm in a period with
m potential entrants vm(pm) is as follows:
(i) If pm < β
m
, the expected payoﬀ is vm(pm) = mΨb.
(ii) If pm = β
m
, the expected payoﬀ is vm(pm) = (1− γm)mΠb+ γmmΨb >
mΨb, where γm =
mΠb−(m+1)Ψb−Φb
m(Πb−Ψb) .
(iii) If pm > β
m
, the mm-Þrm has a deterring Þghting incentive and the
expected payoﬀ is vm(pm) = mΠb.
For the sake of completeness we check in general the optimality of the
equilibrium strategy of the normal mm-Þrm. The move Fm if m ≥ 2 and
pm ≥ βm−1 is optimal since −Φb + (m− 1)Πb > mΨb. The move Fm with
probability σm =
pm
(1−pm)
³
1−βm−1
β
m−1
´
if m ≥ 2 and pm < βm−1 is optimal since
−Φb +
¡
1− γm−1
¢
(m− 1)Πb + γm−1 (m− 1)Ψb = mΨb.
Given the equilibrium strategies and beliefs, the proof of Proposition 2 is
straight forward:
Proof. Suppose β > β
M
. Since β 6= βM Lemma 2 applies and all sm-Þrms
up to the last choose O. Then pm = β > β
m
= β
M
and by the equilibrium
strategy (5) the last sm-Þrm chooses Om. Thus all sm-Þrms choose O. Hence,
by deÞnition, the mm-Þrm has a deterring Þghting incentive and remains
monopolist in all M markets.
3.3 A multimarket Þrm challenges a singlemarket Þrm
In this section we allow the mm-Þrm to enter the market M of an sm-Þrm.
It turns out that mm-Þrms that are large not only beneÞt from deterring
16
entry of sm-Þrms but have an incentive to expand via predatory entry into
markets of sm-Þrms.
The mm-Þrm is the incumbent operator inM − 1 markets. As in the sm-
entry game each of these markets is subject to potential entry by a sm-Þrm.
In addition, we consider a market, M , in which a sm-Þrm is the incumbent
operator and the mm-Þrm the potential entrant. Due to this characteristic
we refer to our game as an mm-entry game as opposed to the sm-entry
game of the previous section which is restricted to analyse entry decisions
of sm-Þrms.
We denote the set of sm-Þrms by S = {a1, ..., aM}. The sm-Þrms in S are
all identical, with the exception that aM is an incumbent and the remaining
sm-Þrms are potential entrants (see Figure 3).
1 = markets
= independent sm-firms
2
= susidiaries of mm-firm
M-1 . . . 1mm-firm
M . . .sm-firms
M-2 M-3
Figure 3: The mm-entry game, Þrst round
The Þrst entry game, played in market M , has three stages. In the Þrst
stage the mm-Þrm chooses to enter or to stay out. If the mm-Þrm chooses to
stay out, this market game ends and the mm-Þrm receives zero payoﬀ while
the sm-incumbent earns monopoly proÞts, Πa > 0. In case the mm-Þrm
enters, the sm-Þrm can either stay in marketM , IM , or exit the market, OM .
In the latter case the market game ends and the sm-incumbent gets a payoﬀ
of zero and the mm-entrant earns monopoly proÞts, Πb > 0. In the former
case it is once again the mm-Þrms turn to either choose to Þght, FM , or to
acquiesce AM . The payoﬀs are deÞned as in the sm-entry game, i.e.:
−Φi < 0 < Ψi < Πi for i = a, b.
In the following M − 1 markets the mm-Þrm operates as the incumbent.
The game tree and the payoﬀ-structure in these market games are exactly
the same as in the post-entry subgame of the Þrst market (see Figure 4). The
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sm
mm
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−Φb
FmAm
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m œ {M - 1, ..., 1}
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( )
( ) ( )
( )
Figure 4: Market games (normal types)
only diﬀerence is that the sm-Þrms actions need to be interpreted as enter
Im or stay out Om for each market m < M .
Again there two types of mm-Þrms. As before, tough mm-Þrms can only
respond to Im by choosing Fm. Note that we do not restrict the action space
of tough Þrms with regard to entering the market of the incumbent sm-Þrm
in market M . Both tough and normal mm-Þrms have the choice to enter or
to stay out.18
Proposition 3 If β > β
M
, the mm-entry game has a PBE in which a nor-
mal mm-Þrm has a deterring Þghting incentive in market M. Given this in-
centive, tough and normal mm-Þrms will enter with probability one, thereby
induce exit of the sm-Þrm in M , and deter entry of all remaining M − 1
sm-entrants.
Thus, for a given β, the normal sm-incumbent will exit if the mm-Þrm
already operates in at least em markets, where em is the smallest integer so
that β > β
em+1
.
Proof. Suppose the mm-Þrm has decided to enter market M . Denote the
post entry belief of the sm-Þrm in M that the mm-Þrm is tough by pM and
18This assumption is natural since we want to derive the entry behaviour of the both
Þrms. In the context of the mm-entry game with sm-Þrms we would obtain the same results
by assuming that tough mm-Þrms always enter. In section 3.4 we allow for more than one
mm-Þrm and would obtain less plausible results if we assumed that tough mm-Þrms always
enter.
18
assume that entry did not lead to an updating of beliefs, β = pM > β
M
. In
this case all sm-Þrms up to sm-Þrm in market 1 will choose O by Lemma 2.
Thus the belief of the sm-Þrm in market one is still β = pM > β
M
and it
will choose O1. Since the sm-Þrm in market one was the last Þrm, the game
ends and the mm-Þrms payoﬀ isMΠb. Thus tough mm-Þrms strictly beneÞt
from entering, independent of the strategy of the normal mm-Þrm. To see
this, suppose the normal mm-Þrm stays out. Then entering reveals that the
mm-Þrm is tough and all sm-Þrms choose O. Suppose the normal mm-Þrm
plans to enter too. Then there is no updating on entry, β = pM > β
M
, and
again all sm-Þrms choose O. Given that the tough mm-Þrm will enter market
M with probability one, the normal mm-Þrm strictly beneÞts from imitating
the tough mm-Þrm and both earn the maximum payoﬀ of Πb.
This PBE outcome is not unique. Suppose both tough and normal mm-
Þrms plan to stay out of market M such that staying out does not lead to
an updating of beliefs. If β = pM−1 > β
M−1
all sm-entrants stay out and the
mm-Þrms payoﬀ is (M −1)Πb. This is an equilibrium strategy if small Þrms
believe that the mm-Þrm is normal (with a high probability) when observing
out-of-equilibrium entry of the mm-Þrm.
Although it is not very intuitive, this equilibrium survives standard equi-
librium reÞnement concepts. This stems from the fact that for any out-
of-equilibrium belief pM both types of the mm-Þrm have exactly the same
preferences with regard to defection. Thus on observing the defection one
cannot learn anything about the type that would allow us to eliminate a type
or restrict the posterior probability of a type.
Equilibrium domination reÞnements as well as D1 and D2 require that
there is an asymmetric defection behaviour of types depending on the out-
of-equilibrium beliefs (and responses) of the other players (Cho and Kreps
1987). Based on this asymmetry either type-message pairs are eliminated
or the posterior probability of a type contingent on a message is restricted.
Taking these reÞnements one step further one may argue that due to the
symmetry in the defection incentives across types sm-Þrms should not update
beliefs at all. This would eliminate the implausible equilibrium in our game.
We propose a diﬀerent reasoning that seems more convincing in the con-
text of our game. In the non-entry equilibrium we require sm-Þrms to
raise the posterior probability that the mm-Þrm is normal when observing
entry. However entering is the equilibrium strategy of both types in the en-
try equilibrium and this equilibrium yields a higher payoﬀ for both types of
the mm-Þrm19. Thus, we suggest that sm-Þrms will believe that entry has
19This also applies to mixed strategies: Any mixed entry strategy has, by deÞnition, an
mm-Þrm staying out of market M with positive probability, ω. Thus the expected payoﬀ
compared to the optimal MΠb is reduced by at least ωΠb.
19
been chosen as part of this equilibrium strategy rather than as a mistake
in the context of the non-entry equilibrium. If so sm-Þrms cannot update
their beliefs when they observe entry and the non-entry equilibrium is ruled
out.20
Propositions 2 and 3 have an interesting implication: If an mm-Þrm that
operates in M markets has a deterring Þghting incentive in market M , both
the mm-entry game and the sm-entry game have allM sm-Þrms choosing O.
This implication follows from the fact that both tough and normal mm-Þrms
enter with probability one so that actions taken with positive probability and
beliefs at the nodes, at which these actions are taken, are exactly identical in
an mm-entry and an sm-entry game once in the mm-entry game the mm-Þrm
has entered the Þrst market.
3.4 A multimarket Þrm challenges another multimar-
ket Þrm
We now investigate the Þghting incentive if one multimarket Þrm considers
entering a market of another multimarket Þrm. The standard approach in
the reputation literature has two long-lived Þrms strategically interact-
ing in a sequence of periods. It has been shown that reputation eﬀects can
be derived as long as the game is of conßicting interest (as the chain-store
paradox, see Schmidt 1993). For two reasons the analysis of the strategic
interaction of two long-lived players is more complicated than the analysis
of one long lived Þrm facing several short lived rivals.21 First, long-run op-
ponents need not play a short-run best response to the anticipated play of
their opponents. Other strategies, including rewards and punishments, may
lead to higher payoﬀs. Second, these rewards and punishments may have to
be carried out occasionally in order to demonstrate their adoption.22 Based
20Pitchik (1993) proposes a selection scheme for a chain-store game with reputation
eﬀects which ranks equilibrium outcomes in terms of the mm-Þrms payoﬀ. This procedure
also picks the plausible equilibrium in our game without referring to out-of-equilibrium
beliefs.
21See for example Celentani et al. (1996), Cripps and Thomas (1995) as well as Evans
and Thomas (1997).
22This does not apply to the traditional chain store game. Schmidt (1993) has shown
that in a game of two long-run players, player one will still be able to achieve his commit-
ment payoﬀ as long as the game is of conßicting interest (like the chain-store paradox) and
player one is suﬃciently more patient than player two. The basic intuition is that player
two will not test player ones type arbitrarily often since the returns from such an invest-
ment will not be valued accordingly if they occur too far in the future. The game needs to
be of conßicting interest, i.e. the strategy to which player one would most like to commit
himself holds player two down to his minimax payoﬀ. Otherwise, one could construct a
continuation equilibrium in which player two is punished if he plays his short-run best
response against the commitment strategy, preventing him from doing so. As a result the
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on our geographical interpretation of the periods another game structure
seems more natural and allows a simpler analysis of the interaction of two
multimarket Þrms. We assume that both mm-Þrms operate in a number of
distinct markets and investigate the incentive of one mm-Þrm to enter a mar-
ket of another mm-Þrm, knowing that the opponent operates in a number
of other markets which can be challenged by sm-Þrms as potential entrants
(see Figure 5).
1 = markets
= independent sm-firms
2
= susidiaries of mm-firms
M . . . 1mm-entrant
N . . . 1mm-incumbent
. . .
. . .
N-1
M-2 M-3M-1
Figure 5: The mm-entry game with two mm-Þrms
Note that we now have two-sided uncertainty in marketM since the mm-
incumbent and the mm-entrant may be tough. The normal mm-incumbent
in market M has the choice either to exit O or to stay I. We assume that
the tough mm-incumbent has a restricted action space and can only choose
I. This assumption is natural since it is closest to the idea that tough mm-
Þrms will always Þght. In order to make the game interesting we assume
that the mm-entrant has a deterring Þghting incentive in the Þrst market.
From Proposition 3 we know that in an mm-entry game with M markets
the normal mm-entrant has a deterring Þghting incentive in the plausible
PBE, if β > β
M
and a strong (and deterring) Þghting incentive if β > β
M−1
.
Note that this Þghting incentive of the mm-entrant is independent of the
expected behaviour of the mm-incumbent in the Þrst market since it results
from the intention to deter entry of the sm-Þrms in the other markets where
the mm-entrant has the incumbent position.
Proposition 4 If βb > β
M−1
b and βa > β
N−1
a , an mm-entrant will not enter
the market of an mm-incumbent in a PBE of the generalised mm-entry game.
payoﬀ is smaller than the commitment payoﬀ. Such an equilibrium cannot be constructed
if player twos payoﬀ is restricted to his minimax payoﬀ anyway and as a result there is
no risk in playing a best response against the commitment strategy.
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Proposition 4 implies that large Þrms do not hit each other. The proof is
in three steps. We Þrst show that the incumbent mm-Þrm will always choose
I. In order to maintain the reputation of being tough the normal mm-entrant
has to Þght and the tough mm-entrant Þghts by deÞnition. Both tough and
normal Þrms prefer not to enter.
Proof. Suppose the mm-entrant enters market M , then the mm-incumbent
will choose I, independent of his type. Tough mm-incumbents always choose
I. The normal mm-incumbent has a strong Þghting incentive, βa > β
N−1
a ,
and it will choose I with probability one, independent of the mm-entrants
strategy (or type). Even if the mm-entrant Þghts with probability one the
mm-incumbent expects to earn more by choosing I than choosing O and
revealing that it is normal. By Assumption (1) we have
−Φa + (N − 1)Πa > (N − 1)Ψa.
Given that the incumbent mm-Þrm will choose I with probability one,
entering marketM will cost the mm-entrant −Φb, independent of his type, if
he wants to maintain his reputation of potentially being tough. Thus tough
mm-entrants will not enter marketM . Since βb > β
M−1
b , the expected payoﬀ
of the ensuing sm-entry game is (M − 1)Πb independent of the strategy of
a normal mm-entrant so that the expected payoﬀ of entering market M is
smaller:
−Φb + (M − 1)Πb < (M − 1)Πb.
Since tough mm-entrants stay out of market M, doing the same does not
reveal the type of a normal mm-entrant. Thus normal mm-entrants can avoid
incurring the cost of Þghting and still deter entry in the remaining M − 1
markets. In equilibrium both tough and normal Þrms with a strong Þghting
incentive will not enter a market in which they can expect the incumbent to
stay in with probability one.
Again both types of the mm-Þrm cannot improve on this PBE. Any other
equilibrium strategy has an mm-Þrm entering market M with positive prob-
ability, ω. Since the mm-incumbent will stay in with probability one, en-
tering market M must lead to an expected payoﬀ that is lower compared to
(M−1)Πb. Either the mm-Þrm Þghts and (in the best case) maintains its rep-
utation yielding −Φb + (M − 1)Πb < (M − 1)Πb or the mm-Þrm acquiesces
yielding MΨb < (M − 1)Πb (by Assumption 2).
Thus, by the same argument as for Proposition 3, we argue that sm-Þrms
will not believe that either tough or normal mm-Þrms will choose to stay out
by mistake (which is required to sustain any other PBE). Rather they will
interpret this as an equilibrium move of the equilibrium proposed above.
Proposition 4 does not depend on the diﬀerence in size as such. Rather
if the mm-incumbent controls a critical minimum of markets so that it has a
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strong deterring Þghting incentive it deters entry of Þrms that have a strong
Þghting incentive, even if they are much larger mm-Þrms.
The results for the remaining parameter constellations are provided in
the appendix.
4 Multimarket Þrms and imperfect capital mar-
kets
The position of multimarket Þrms may be strengthened further if imperfect
capital markets hinder perfect external funding of operations so that mm-
Þrms have access to larger funds than sm-Þrms or smaller mm-Þrms. The idea
that asymmetric Þnancial constraints may provide a rationale for predatory
behaviour has been thoroughly investigated by Benoit (1983). He counters
the common argument that predation would be too costly to be a credible
threat (or to occur) by showing that if strategic interaction with Þnancial
constraints is analysed in a repeated game with complete and perfect infor-
mation predation may well play an important role in deterring entry even if
the expected value of future monopoly proÞts would justify only one period
of Þghting and the Þnancially constrained Þrm could survive a large number
of periods.
In contrast to most recent work23 on the long purse argument we do not
intend to investigate more fully the nature of the capital market imperfections
that give rise to these constraints - we simply assume external Þnancing to
be constrained. However, we think of these constraints to be determined by
the number of markets a Þrm operates in. This assumption intends to bring
out most clearly the Þnding that external funding may be rationed and seems
particularly relevant in localised markets as in transport or retailing where
cross-subsidies from one local market to another are considered to play an
important role. Although being obviously an indirect and imperfect indicator
of access to funds the size in terms of market coverage is likely to matter in
network industries since it is easily observable. In order to sharpen the view
even further we may interpret market coverage in localised markets as being
determined by the number of markets a Þrm operates in. This perspective is
helpful in that it immediately induces an interesting question. If large Þrms
can exploit their Þnancial strength as a mean to deter entry, can they use
their advantage in order to become even larger?
23See for instance Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) or Hendel (1996).
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4.1 A reduced form mm-entry game
As in the mm-entry game with reputation, we consider the strategic inter-
action of a multimarket Þrm that operates in M − 1 markets and considers
entering marketM in which a single-market Þrm is the incumbent. However,
in order to abstract from the reputation eﬀect and to concentrate on the long
purse eﬀect we only model the market in which the sm-Þrm is the incumbent
and the mm-Þrm considers entry. In order to relate Þnancial strength to the
number of markets in which a Þrm operates, we assume that the mm-Þrm
earns identical proÞts, πi > 0, in each of the M − 1 markets where it is the
incumbent. There is no (or equal) external funding for the two Þrms. Hence,
both Þrms are Þnancially constrained by the sum of proÞts in all markets
they operate in, so that the single-market Þrm is more constrained than the
multimarket Þrm. Benoit (1983 and 1984) investigates the case where the
Þnancially stronger Þrm is the incumbent. Here we analyse the reverse situ-
ation so that the Þnancially stronger mm-Þrm considers entry in the market
of the Þnancially weaker sm-Þrm.
The structure of the entry game in market M is the same as in the
reputation game. However, payoﬀs are now derived more explicitly analysing
strategic interaction over time considering an inÞnite time horizon. The
Þrms per period payoﬀs depend on the state of competition: In a monopoly
situation Þrms earn π > 0. If Þrms Þght, they each lose −φ, φ > 0. If they
acquiesce, they each gain ψ ≥ 0. As in the reputation game, it is assumed
that the Þrms gain more as monopolists than as duopolists: π > ψ. Firms
discount at rate r, with 0 < r < 1, and maximise the net present value of
their expected income stream.
If the mm-entrant b stays out, the sm-incumbent a will remain a monop-
olist forever and earn monopoly proÞts, Πa =
P∞
t=0 r
tπ. If it enters, it is the
sm-Þrms move whether to stay, I, or to exit, O. If the sm-Þrm exits, the
mm-Þrm will remain monopolist forever and earn monopoly proÞts, Πb = Πa.
Alternatively, the sm-Þrm may choose to stay. In this case it is the mm-Þrms
decision whether to acquiesce, A, or to Þght until the sm-Þrm will have to
exit the market, F . Acquiescing yields Ψa = Ψb =
P∞
t=0 r
tψ for both Þrms.
If the mm-Þrm chooses to Þght, it will lose during the Þghting periods and
earn monopoly proÞts thereafter. The Þghting periods are determined by
the staying power of the Þrm which is Þnancially more constrained and the
willingness to Þght. In our context the Þnancial constraint is determined by
the number of markets a Þrm operates in. Since by deÞnition the sm-Þrm
operates only in one market, the sm-Þrm is more constrained than the mul-
timarket Þrm. If the mm-Þrm Þghts all periods, Na, that the sm-Þrm can
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sustain Þghting, then the mm-Þrms discounted proÞts are given by
Φb = −
NaX
t=0
rtφ+
∞X
t=Na+1
rtπ. (6)
In this case sm-Þrm as payoﬀ will be:
Φa = −1− r
Na
1− r φ.
stay out enter
mm-firm
0
Πb
Ψa
Ψb
Φa
Φb
(F)(A)
(O) (I)
sm-firm
mm-firm
Πa
0
sm-incumbent
mm-entrant
Figure 6: An incomplete capital markets game
The game, which is depicted in Figure 6, has two subgame perfect Nash
equilibria depending on whether the number of periods, Lb, that the mm-Þrm
is willing to Þght is larger than the number of periods, Na, that the sm-Þrm
can sustain Þghting. The willingness to Þght, Lb, denotes the number of
periods that mm-Þrm b would prefer Þghting over acquiescing.24
The willingness to Þght Lb can be determined by setting equation (6)
(given that the number of Þghting periods is Lb− 1) equal to Ψb and solving
for Lb:
Φb = Ψb
−
Lb−1X
t=0
rtφ+
∞X
t=Lb
rtπ =
∞X
t=0
rtψ
24Benoit (1983) has called Lb the Þghting incentive. We amended his terminology
in order to preserve the term Þghting incentive for a more general interpretation (see
section 3.2). Note that we assume that the discounted gain from a monopoly in later
periods is at least large enough to motivate a Þght of one period, i.e. Lb > 1.
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−1− r
Lb
1− r φ+
rLb
1− rπ =
1
1− rψ
Lb =
ln (φ+ ψ)− ln (φ+ π)
ln r
Whenever the sm-Þrms staying power is smaller than the mm-Þrms will-
ingness to Þght, Na < Lb, mm-Þrm b will choose to Þght until the sm-Þrm
exits in the last stage if sm-Þrm a stays in. Hence the only subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium is that sm-Þrm a exits the market, yielding enter/O/F as
the equilibrium strategies.
Suppose now Na > Lb. We would then have Ψb < Φb and analysing
the post entry game yields the following Nash equilibria: O/F , O/A, I/A.
However, as can be seen from the game tree, if we require equilibria to be
subgame perfect, I/A is the only equilibrium outcome. This is because the
sm-Þrm can anticipate that if it chooses I, the best response for mm-Þrm b
is A. Taking this into account I is the better choice for the sm-Þrm.
In general, if the staying power of the sm-incumbent is smaller than the
mm-entrants willingness to Þght, Na < Lb, the mm-entrant has a strong
Þghting incentive and will successfully drive the sm-incumbent oﬀ the market
without a Þght.
4.2 Extensive form mm-entry games
The model outlined above is in a way trivial: if there is an incentive to
Þght longer than the incumbent can survive, predatory entry is a reasonable
strategy. One of the main contributions of Benoit (1983) is to show that
in a game with complete information and an inÞnite horizon, the Þnancially
weaker Þrm will not challenge the stronger Þrm even if the willingness to Þght
of the stronger Þrm is smaller than the staying power of the weaker Þrm.
His argument can be adapted to our mm-entry game. Consider an inÞnite-
horizon game where the Þnancially stronger entrant moves Þrst and the in-
cumbent is Þnancially constrained. Despite the inÞnite horizon of the game
as a whole, the argument relies on a backward induction. This technique can
be employed since the number of periods in which the Þnancially weaker Þrm
is able to stay provides a Þnite starting point for the backward reasoning.
Consider period Na after Na−1 periods of Þghting. If the Þnancially stronger
entrant decides to Þght in this period the incumbent is forced to exit. Know-
ing this the entrant will Þght as long as the willingness to Þght is at least one
period (note that we assume that the willingness to Þght is independent from
the number of Þghts that have occurred in the past). Anticipating this, the
incumbent will exit the period before. Knowing this, the Þnancially stronger
entrant would be prepared to Þght in period Na − 2 provided that the will-
ingness to Þght is at least one period. This will again be anticipated by the
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incumbent who will choose to exit the period before. This reasoning can be
continued backward to the Þrst period in which the incumbent will choose
to exit. Hence, the result is independent of the relative strength of the will-
ingness to Þght and the staying power. Thus, independent of the number of
periods the sm-Þrm could survive Þghting if the mm-Þrm Þnds it proÞtable
to Þght no more than one period, the weaker Þrm would have to choose O.
Not surprisingly, Benoit has called this result a kind of reverse chain-
store paradox (Benoit 1984, p. 492). Considering this outcome as unre-
alistic he introduces incomplete information about the type of weak Þrm:
the strong Þrm does not know for sure whether it plays a game as described
above or whether the weak Þrm will stick it out to the end no matter what.
In this set up the Þnancially stronger Þrm may be unable to deter the weaker
Þrm. The probability that this is the case is an increasing function of the
entrants staying power and a decreasing function of incumbents willingness
to Þght (see Benoit 1984, p. 496).
Given our approach to link the Þnancial strength to the number of markets
controlled, all versions of the Þnancial strength models sketched suggest that
if the diﬀerence in size is larger than a threshold, mm-Þrms have a Þghting
incentive and will threaten to use predatory behaviour in order to induce
exit. Firms that operate in the same or a similar number of markets are not
going to enter. Note that contrary to the results in the reputation models the
long purse eﬀect depends on relative size whereas in the reputation model
an mm-Þrm has a strong Þghting incentive if it controls a critical number of
markets.
5 Results and stylised facts
Despite the popularity of reputation and long purse models in the theoret-
ical literature, their use in applied work has been rare. In the introduction
we noted a number of stylised facts with regard to structure, conduct and
performance in some network industries with low sunk costs. Here we want
to assess the explanatory value of the models developed above and recon-
sider some of the Þndings of the spatial competition models and the theory
of contestable markets by referring to the example of the bus industry.
The spatial competition model entails the assumptions of one-bus oper-
ators that accommodate entry, reschedule and earn zero proÞts; all of which
are clearly incompatible with observations (see stylised facts 4 and 5). The
theory of contestable markets does require reactions lags which are not given
(stylised fact 2) and fails to explain, Þrst, why unproÞtable post-entry com-
petition occurred (stylised fact 5) and, second, why industry concentration
increased (stylised fact 4). The models developed in this paper address these
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shortcomings and provide at least partial explanations for most observations.
Why did Þrms almost never reschedule their departure times following
entry of a competitor despite of the relatively small costs involved? Our rep-
utation model provides a very intuitive answer. Consider every bus as serving
a distinct market. If the incumbent relocates (acquiesces) in one market, po-
tential entrants for other markets would conclude that the incumbent will
relocate there too. Thus more entrants would follow so that proÞts in the
entire network will be reduced. Hence, whenever the cost of Þghting in one
market is oﬀset by the gains in the remaining markets, the incumbent will
apply this strategy to the entire network - indeed to each single bus. Thus
there is no incentive to relocate.25 From this follows that the potential en-
trant will perceive a route or a network as being a natural monopoly although
from a cost perspective this is only true for the operation of a single bus.
Why did we observe costly competition? In line with many models of
predation under uncertainty, predation may occur in our model as a result of
randomising strategies of players and the existence of tough players. Hence,
we can explain the occasional occurrence of costly competition. Often, how-
ever, predation may not be observed but nevertheless play an important role
as a barrier to entry or as a cause for exit or merger.
Why did large Þrms almost never enter markets of other large Þrms?
Incumbents that operate in many markets have a strong Þghting incentive
and will Þght to preserve their reputation. Thus tough and normal mm-
entrants prefer to stay out.
Why did industry concentration increase, despite the lack of signiÞcant
economies of scale or scope on the national level? The fact that in our model
eﬀective barriers to entry may exist if there is a strong Þghting incentive
combined with the Þnding that this Þghting incentive depends on the number
of markets a Þrm operates in, provides an explanation for the obvious strive
to grow that was to be observed in the UK bus industry.26
Altogether our Þndings have a simple policy implication. Do not rely
on the absence of sunk costs when suggesting that competition will be ef-
fective. In multimarket industries a well functioning competition authority
is required to maintain competition. Whether ex post competition inquiries
25Other explanations why relocation did not occur may include: First, entrants may
have come in at a full scale making relocation obsolete. Second, there may be a value to a
simple pattern of departure times providing a disincentive to reschedule during parts of the
day (take out one bus). Third, rescheduling may be more costly than obvious because of
the requirement to either inform or lose passengers. Fourth, non-cooperative rescheduling
is indeed diﬃcult to achieve if there is no outright agreement.
26However, the explanatory power of the model presented here may be limited regarding
the operations of very small bus companies. Large bus companies may not Þnd it worthwile
to predate very small operators in particular if this small operator runs a tendered (non-
commercial) service during part of the day.
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suﬃce to ensure eﬀective competition is a matter for further investigation.
An alternative is to organise competition for the market rather than in the
market. In fact, this is the route many developed countries have taken. We
believe for the wrong reason: market forces are able to ensure an integrated
supply of local transport but they may fail to ensure eﬀective competition.
The competition authorities in the UK allowed mergers in non contigu-
ous markets, arguing that this would not impede potential competition which
they expected from bus operators in contiguous markets. From the perspec-
tive of our analysis this approach is misguided. If the aggressive behaviour
of a multimarket Þrm in one town can be observed by potential entrants in
another town it may eﬀectively deter entry in the latter.
6 Conclusion
In the theoretical literature predation models based on Þnancial constraints
or reputation have been popular. The research on reputation has shown that
the general Þnding that reputation eﬀects may have a signiÞcant impact on
the equilibrium payoﬀs in repeated games is robust with regard to the num-
ber of players types, the horizon of the game and many details regarding
the informational structure (Fudenberg and Levine 1989, Schmidt 1993, Ce-
lentani et al. 1996). Our work distinguishes two types of players, we require
equilibria to be perfect and, as a natural result of our sequencing, the horizon
is Þnite. In this respect our work is much closer to the original framework of
analysis used by MR and KW. This approach has several advantages. First,
since we are explicit with respect to the structure of the game we can refer to
a speciÞc market in order to motivate our setup and compare our Þndings (in
our case multimarket industries like bus services etc.). Second, we can use
diﬀering market games rather than repeat the same source game. As a result
we can capture the reputation eﬀects in the context of entry rather than en-
try deterrence. Third, although we do not in all constellations have a unique
equilibrium outcome we Þnd only one plausible PBE in each constellation
given the payoﬀs and priors.
Table 1.:
Results for mm-Þrms with a strong Þghting incentive
(βb > β
M−1
b , βa > β
N−1
a )
Entry constellation in M PBE outcome
sm-Þrm → mm-Þrm entry deterrence27
mm-Þrm → sm-Þrm predatory entry
mm-Þrm → mm-Þrm entry deterrence (collusion)
27This result also holds if the mm-Þrm has a deterring Þghting incentive, βb > β
M
b .
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Table 1. summarises our main results. We believe that these have impli-
cations for applied as well as theoretical work. Using a sequencing, which we
consider as more realistic, we strengthen the result of the traditional chain-
store games that introduce uncertainty about the multimarket Þrms type.
While in the traditional framework there are always some last markets
where sm-Þrms enter with positive probability, in our setup no sm-Þrm will
enter the market of an mm-Þrm in equilibrium if it controls a certain number
of markets.
We Þnd that both capital market imperfections and uncertainty about
the opponents type can lead to an incentive for predatory entry which may
operate alongside the well-established entry deterring eﬀect of the threat of
predation. Thus, being large leads to two advantages: it may deter rivals
entry and it may allow predatory entry that drives out sm-Þrms without
a Þght. Seen in the context of market evolution both arguments imply a
strong incentive to grow: on the one hand in order to lift local Þnancial
constraints by increasing the potential for internal Þnancing (cross subsidising
local markets) and, on the other, to make competitors believe that one is
prepared to invest in a local Þght in order to beneÞt from the reputation of
being tough elsewhere.
This leads to a natural follow up question. If there is an incentive to
grow and if predatory entry is one way of growing, why dont large Þrms use
this as a threat in order to buy small Þrms and thereby avoid investment in
entry. Thus even if predation is not observed, it may explain a process of
concentration through mergers and acquisitions in network industries. We
believe that addressing this question more thoroughly is an interesting topic
for future research.
Moreover, our results suggest that multimarket Þrms of a certain size will
avoid entering each others patch. This leads to an interesting insight for
the more general work on reputation eﬀects with two long-lived players. The
usual assumption is that two long-lived players interact in either one market
for many periods or sequentially in many markets. Often results derived
in this setup are either not very speciÞc or not very robust with regard
to the information structure of the game since Þrms may use complicated
punishment strategies to enforce a certain behaviour of the rival. In our
framework we get a simple collusion result without referring to complicated
strategies.
Comparing the long-purse and the reputation eﬀect, both support the
same general Þndings. However there is one interesting diﬀerence. For given
expectations regarding the various payoﬀs, the long purse model suggests
that the Þghting incentive depends on the relative size of Þrms. The repu-
tation model on the other hand suggests that Þrms will avoid contesting an
opponents local market as long as he controls a minimum of other markets
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that make the investment in Þghting for the Þrst market worthwhile.
Since the three advantages of growing large, entry deterrence, potential
predatory entry and collusion, are unlikely to create beneÞcial welfare ef-
fects, a post liberalisation process of concentration may imply a need for a
more eﬀective competition policy rather than a natural evolution to the most
eﬃcient market structure.
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Appendix
If the mm-incumbent does not have a strong Þghting incentive, we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 5 If βb > β
M−1
b and βa ≤ β
N−1
a , an mm-entrant will enter
the market of any rival mm-Þrm that operates in less than eN markets in a
PBE of the generalised mm-entry game. The mm-incumbent will randomise
between staying in, I, and exiting, O.
Proof. By assumption the mm-entrant has a strong Þghting incentive, βb >
β
M−1
b but the mm-incumbent not, βa ≤ β
N−1
a . Knowing that the mm-entrant
will Þght with probability one, the mm-incumbent will not choose I with
probability one. Choosing I yields an expected payoﬀ in market N that
is smaller than zero, −Φa. Since tough mm-incumbents will always choose
I there is no updating if normal mm-incumbents do so too. Hence, the
expected payoﬀ in the following market remains (N − 1)Ψa even if the mm-
incumbents decides to stay in. Choosing O with probability one cannot be
an equilibrium either. If this was the strategy, the sm-Þrms in later markets
believe that the mm-incumbent is tough if he stays in. Thus a normal mm-
incumbent could improve his payoﬀ by choosing I. Thus in equilibrium the
mm-incumbent will randomise and choose I with probability σa so that the
sm-entrant in the next market randomises entry which in turn supports the
randomising strategy in market N . Since
σa =
βa
(1− βa)
Ã
1− βN−1a
βa
N−1
!
this probability will approach one as N grows within the parameter space
deÞned by βa ≤ βN−1a .28 Thus for high N tough and normal mm-entrants
will not enter since the same argument applies as in the proof of Proposition
4. Below a critical level of N , eN, both tough and normal mm-entrants will
enter market M . More precisely, eN is given by the N that yields
(M − 1)Πb = ((1− βa) σ + βa) (−Φb + (M − 1)Πb) + (1− βa) (1− σ)MΠb
(M − 1)Πb =
Ã
(1− βa)
βb
(1− βb)
Ã
1
β
N−1 − 1
!
+ βa
!
(−Φb + (M − 1)Πb)
+ (1− βa)
Ã
1− βb
(1− βb)
Ã
1
β
N−1 − 1
!!
MΠb
28βa ≤ β
N−1
a implies σa ≤ 1.
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eN = 1
ln β
ln βbβ
(βa − 1)Φb + (βa − 1)Πb
(βa − βb)Φb + (βa − 1)Πb
.
The Proposition derived above has one property that simpliÞes the anal-
ysis and leads to an equilibrium in pure entry strategies. Neither tough nor
normal mm-entrants have an incentive to defect from a pooling equilibrium
candidate with respect to the entry decision of the mm-Þrm.29 In case the
mm-entrant does not have a strong Þghting incentive we do not necessarily
obtain this property; rather mm-Þrms entry behaviour must involve ran-
domising.
Suppose the mm-entrant controls M markets so that βb < β
M
b and the
mm-incumbent has a strong Þghting incentive, βa > β
N−1
a , and suppose both
tough and normal mm-entrants would enter market M with probability one.
This cannot be an equilibrium since the tough mm-entrant would prefer to
stay out rather than spend (−Φ) on Þghting in the Þrst market, independent
from the belief that the sm-Þrms in the remaining markets entertain when
observing the mm-Þrm defecting.30
Both staying out with probability one cannot be an equilibrium either.
In this case the normal mm-entrant would prefer to enter since doing so will
yield at least MΨb > (M − 1)Ψb. Again this result is independent from
the belief that the sm-Þrms in M and the remaining markets entertain when
observing the mm-Þrm defecting.
However, diﬀering pure entry strategies cannot be an equilibrium either.
Suppose the normal mm-Þrm will enter and a tough mm-entrant will stay
out of market M with probability one. Knowing that it will have to Þght
in market M with probability one given that the sm-Þrm in this market will
enter and knowing that staying out reveals that it is tough and thereby deter
entry in markets M − 1, ..., 1 the tough mm-entrant prefers to stay out of
market M since
−Φb + (M − 1)Πb < (M − 1)Πb.
However, if so it cannot be optimal for the normal mm-Þrm to enter
market M . Rather it would prefer to stay out, mimic the tough mm-Þrm
and earn (M − 1)Πb > MΨb. The same kind of argument applies if the
normal mm-entrant considers to stay out.
Thus there can be no equilibrium in which a tough mm-Þrm plays a
diﬀerent pure entry strategy than the normal mm-Þrm. Since playing the
29In traditional reputation models tough mm-Þrms would have an incentive to defect
since normal mm-Þrms face, unplausibly, entry with positive probability in late periods.
30Strictly speaking it is possible to assume out of equilibrium beliefs that ensure that
both types choosing to enter market M is an equilibrium: if sm-Þrms believe that a mm-
entrant that does not enter (a zero probability event) is normal, the tough mm-entrant
may have no incentive not to enter the Þrst market.
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strategy of the tough mm-Þrm would reveal the tough Þrm, the normal
Þrm would then prefer to imitate rather than play the diﬀering strategy. In
equilibrium mm-entrants will randomise entry.
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